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MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Cuba

I.

ELEMENTS OF THE ORIGINAL DEAL

1. The Soviets undertook:

a. To dismantle and remove the "weapons you call offensive".

b. To have UN verify the "dismantling of these means".

c. "With suitable safeguards to halt the further introduction of such weapon systems" (This is a U.S., not Soviet, formulation).

d. In effect, to eliminate Cuba's ~~defensive~~ military potential also, once the United States has given the assurances of non-invasion.

2. The United States agreed "upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the UN to ^{commitments} ensure the carrying out and continuation of these ~~commitments~~" -

a. To remove promptly the quarantine, and

b. To give assurances against an invasion of Cuba.

3. Cuba agreed (in the U Thant-Castro correspondence):

a. To direct "that the construction and development of major military facilities be suspended during the period

of negotiations

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of negotiations which are now underway", but only

b. "provide" that "... the United States Government
resists from threats and aggressive acts against Cuba,
including the ^{naval} ~~naval~~ blockade."

II.

STATUS OF THE DEAL (November 12, 1962)

1. a. The Soviets have eliminated, dismantled, and shipped
out their missiles - probably all of them, though that
cannot be known without ground inspection.

b. The Soviets have not

- removed "other offensive weapons" (IL-28
bombers).

- removed nuclear warheads, except possibly
for missiles.

- secured any ground inspection of the
"dismantling of these means",

c. The Soviets, unable to deliver on a UN verification
scheme because of Castro's objections, have permitted close
alongside inspection of departing missile ships - an act on
the part of U.S. warships which they might have labeled an
act of war two or three weeks earlier.


2. The United

2. The United States has not performed on its side, matching fulfillments of Soviet performance.

3. The Soviet Government (and the Soviets) has held off shooting at U.S. reconnaissance planes but has otherwise frustrated the rapid carrying out of Khrushchev's commitments.

III.

We are now awaiting

1. Khrushchev's reply to President's letter -- especially on removal of IL-28s.
 2. Mikoyan's report on discussions with Castro
 3. Results of negotiations between U Thant and Cubans on some way of contriving UN verification within Cuba (the "five-embassy proposal").
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IV.

If Castro does not cooperate at all, the first problem is how to terminate the short-term transaction with the Soviets, while maintaining maximum pressure on Castro.

Under these conditions, could we settle with the Soviets for lifting the quarantine when they have removed all their missiles and all the IL-28s, together with warheads, with verification only through the along-side procedure presently in use for the missile ships?

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If so, we might tell them now (at Dobrynin or Luznetsov level, not another Presidential letter) that we will lift the quarantine as soon as they agree to take out the remaining bombers and warheads, if they will set their own (early) deadline for completing that removal.

This would leave open the whole question of the future. It would change the basic deal we originally made, which made both the quarantine and the non-invasion assurances contingent on both the verified removal of offensive weapons and the safeguarded promise not to reintroduce them. The change would trade the quarantine for the short-term performance of the Soviets alone, and reserve the longer-term assurances as the counter for the longer-term arrangements to keep offensive weapons out of Cuba.

As between the Soviets and the United States, it would clearly be our round. But it would be Castro's round too, since he would have frustrated the combined efforts of the world's two great powers to get him to buy some form, ^{almost any} ~~sixteenth~~ form, of on-ground verification.

7.

If Castro does not cooperate at all, the second problem is how to establish long-term arrangements to ensure ourselves and our OAS neighbors against the reintroduction (or squirreling away in caves) of offensive weapons in Cuba.

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The only available recourse would be

1. As firm and public an undertaking as we can get from the Soviets against the reintroduction of offensive weapons into the Hemisphere, registered perhaps in a formal statement to the Security Council.

2. Continued air reconnaissance, under the existing OAS resolution of October 23rd (which recommends that "member states ... take all measures, individually and collectively including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent ...")

3. If it appears that the Soviets (or the Chinese) are again shipping in offensive weapons, the quarantine could be reimposed; the stopping of Soviet ships would be justified by their having reneged on their formal guarantee of non-reintroduction.

4. If the Cubans started using the equipment they already have to foment trouble in the Hemisphere, it would be clear that the OAS under the Rio Treaty would have to take such action as might be necessary, up to and including invasion.

VI.
II. FACTS

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VI.

If Castro does cooperate, the first problem will be how attenuated a form of ground inspection can we afford to buy?

U Thant's original proposal was to have it done by the five Latin American embassies now in Havana. He said this would be all right if they were working for the Secretary General, if they had a free run of the island, and if they had some technically competent help provided from the outside by the UN. ^{Castro,} This proposal was put to ~~himself~~; who did not accept it.

U Thant is now talking about any ^{FIVE} ~~five~~ ambassadors, now in Cuba. This might still be all right, if Bloc embassies are excluded from the panel, and if the same strictures as above still apply.

VII.

If Castro does cooperate, the second problem will be how to establish a long- arm arrangement for verifying the absence of offensive weapons in Cuba.

The best arrangement would seem to be a Latin-American de-nuclearized zone with a UN presence attached to it, as outlined in the memorandum dated November 10, 1962, from the Secretary of State to the President. This would require the Cubans to accept no more rigorous inspection arrangements than would be accepted by all the other members of the zone.

If necessary,

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If necessary, this pot could be further sweetened by some form of UN inspection to make sure that the countries of the Caribbean area (including the United States) are not preparing to invade each other. This would involve UN inspection of any reported Cuban refugee training establishments in Guatemala, Puerto Rico, Florida, or wherever.

VII.

In any event, we should maintain in any ultimate arrangement the possibility of periodic air surveillance of Cuba. Only with our own air surveillance (conducted under OAS auspices) will we be able to detect new suspicious activity in Cuba that bears looking at more closely by whatever international inspectorate is established. Moreover, if (under some of the above assumptions) we have never completed the verification of the original transaction continued air surveillance is justified as the necessary offset to Cuban unwillingness to permit on-site inspection of the Soviet withdrawal.